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Why would bilateral donors intermediate aid through a multilateral and not extend 
aid directly? This paper suggests a trade-off: multiple bilateral donors for each 
recipient may imply coordination and strategic problems but intermediating 
through a multilateral may dilute individual donor objectives. The paper conducts 
traditional panel and truly bilateral regressions with bilateral-pair, fixed effects to 
model aid allocation decisions. The results confirm that politics is important for 
bilateral donors but also that aid fragmentation and strategic behavior affect aid 
allocation. Multilaterals solve strategic and coordination problems between 
donors and, while politics remains significant, there is some evidence for a 
dilution of this effect.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Foreign aid net flows have risen over the last few years to reach US$67.5bn in 2003. Some 55.5 
percent of this total was in the form of direct bilateral aid from the 22 bilateral donors tracked in 
the OECD ODA database, 22 percent was aid financed and extended by multilaterals and 21.5 
percent was aid financed by bilaterals but intermediated through a multilateral.
2 Total aid to 
developing countries is graphed in Figure 1 from 1975 to 2003.
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The objective of this paper is to extend the small but growing literature on the 
determinants of aid flows. This is important for a number of reasons, first to shed light on 
donors’ aid policies and the role of multilateral versus bilateral agencies. Second, in our view if 
we understand better the allocation of aid then we may also learn why aid is sometimes not as 
effective as we would like.
4 Third, the policies of granting aid over time have led to a significant 
                                                       
2 The bilateral aid donated through multilaterals is typically administered in the form of trust funds and other 
vehicles apart from aid financed by a multilaterals’ own resources. 
3 Data from the OECD’s Official Development Assistance database. 
4 On the effectiveness of aid on growth see for example Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly (2004), Rajan and 
Subramanian (2005) and the discussion in Radelet (2006). Radelet claims there are three views regarding the 
effectiveness of aid in growth: a)  a positive, probably non-linear relation (diminishing returns), b)  no relation (or   5
stock of non-grant assistance that has given rise to a debate on debt relief. While we do not 
discuss debt relief in this paper, the efficacy of debt relief is tied to the role and effectiveness of 
aid which again, in our view, may be driven by how aid is allocated.
5 
The literature on aid allocation has stressed that donors may be influenced by political or 
other ties to recipients. We confirm these results below, but we also stress that there may be 
interaction effects between donors. Some authors have alluded to a problem regarding aid 
fragmentation, and others that donors may interact strategically, although we know of no 
systematic empirical analysis of these issues in relation to aid allocation.
6 In Figure 2, we 
illustrate the aid extended by donors to each of the 149 recipients that received some positive aid 
from  at least one donor over the last five-year period of our data. Aid is indeed highly 
fragmented: no fewer than 28 recipients received aid from all 22 donors in the database, and the 
median number of donors for each recipient is 10. 
In the next section, we discuss the literature regarding the determinants of aid flows in the 
context of our aim to compare bilateral and multilateral aid allocation. In Section 3 we use that 
discussion to motivate our main research questions and explain our methodology. In Section 4 







                                                                                                                                                                           
even a negative relation), and c) a conditional relation (dependent on the characteristics of recipient policies or of 
donors). He suggests the former has been heavily researched but not the latter. Our contribution is that we consider 
both donor and recipient characteristics. 
5 For example, see Birdsall et al. (2001), who argue that debt relief may be better than aid, as debt relief may be 
expected to be “less tied” than aid. 
6 On aid fragmentation, Radelet (2006), Knack and Rahman (2004) and Roodman (2006) suggest that many bilateral 
agencies and a proliferation of aid projects may overburden recipient governments and decrease bureaucratic quality 
in recipients. On strategic effects, Torsvik (2005) suggests that if donors cooperate they may not be able to credibly 
restrict aid, and this may then blunt recipients’ incentives to reform. 
   6





















Note: In this figure we curtail those observations greater than US$400 million. 
 
 
2. Aid Allocation: Bilaterals versus Multilaterals 
 
The small but growing literature on aid allocation has focused on explaining the pattern of 
bilateral aid.  Trumbull and Wall (1994) develop a simple model of bilateral aid flows and 
conduct a panel data analysis across recipient countries including variables to reflect aggregate 
economic ties. Alesina and Dollar (2000) compare bilateral aid flows to private FDI flows, 
arguing that the former are driven more by politics and the latter more by economics. They argue 
that individual bilateral donors differ in their preferences and conduct regressions for individual 
donors. On the other hand, Chong (2006) suggests that a set of donor characteristics may be 
important in explaining aid patterns. Motivated by a theoretical model, he suggests that donor 
size, donor institutions (lack of corruption, etc.), tax revenues and donor equality may all affect 
(positively) aid extended.  
In this paper, we suggest that bilaterals may face a trade-off.  On the one hand, a bilateral 
may wish to pursue its own objectives, whether they be altruistic, political or economic, while on 
Recipients 
Donors  7
the other hand several bilaterals lending to each recipient may create a set of inefficiencies. Then 
again, bilaterals may use multilaterals to intermediate assistance. In this paper we consider two 
types of multilateral intermediation. 
Multilaterals, initially financed by bilaterals through injections of capital, may finance aid 
from their own resources, generally from retained profits. There is a small literature on 
multilateral lending more generally. Regarding general IFI lending, Faini and Grilli (2002) argue 
that politics is important for IFI behavior and for the World Bank in particular. Barro and Lee 
(2005) suggest that political factors affect IMF lending. This is confirmed in  Bobba (2004). Our 
prior is that, while multilaterals may not eliminate politics as a determinant of aid allocation, 
they are likely to dilute the particular wishes of each bilateral donor. To date, we do not know of 
any work that attempts to compare the aid allocation decisions of bilaterals versus multilaterals. 
Another possibility is for a bilateral to give aid to a multilateral to administer through the 
medium of trust funds or other vehicles. Bilaterals may impose restrictions on the use of these 
“donations,” and thus the determinants of bilateral aid allocation may still be relevant. However, 
if aid is administered by a multilateral, whether it is financed by bilaterals or the multilateral’s 
own resources, one might expect fragmentation and strategic problems to be significantly 
reduced. We do not know of previous work that takes advantage of the OECD data on bilateral 
funds extended to multilaterals to analyze these propositions and hence consider this to be a 
further contribution of this paper. 
Aid fragmentation problems may occur in the planning, implementation and monitoring 
phases of a particular project and may also be related to more general  macroeconomic policies. 
Rodrik (1995) for example, argues that multilaterals may have a comparative advantage over 
bilaterals in imposing conditions in loan contracts. It might also be noted that multilaterals tend 
to be more senior than bilaterals when it comes to debt restructurings, suggesting a comparative 
disadvantage for bilaterals in lending to a sovereign.
7,8 
Coordination problems suggest that a bilateral lender may prefer to finance where other 
bilaterals are not present.  Indeed, it might be argued that if a single bilateral extends finance to a 
                                                       
7 A country might attempt to selectively default on one bilateral, hoping that relations with others will not be 
affected although the Paris Club attempts to prevent such behavior. See Paris Club, 
 http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/presentation/presentation.php?BATCH=B01WP04 
8 Argentina currently remains in default with its bilateral lenders—and has not started negotiations—but remains 
current on its payments to multilateral lenders. The World Bank’s 2005 annual report lists only five countries in 
arrears with that institution.   8
single recipient, then multilateral intermediation would not be required, as the single bilateral 
would internalize any inefficiencies arising from the presence of many donors. If bilaterals care 
about aid effectiveness, and this is reduced due to aid fragmentation, then the amount of aid from 
each donor may depend on measures of aid concentration. This argument suggests that the more 
concentrated is bilateral lending (across donors for a single recipient), then the more bilateral 
lending a recipient may receive.
 
Donors may also act strategically in several different ways. If donors care about recipient 
welfare and hence the total amount of aid given, then one donor may free-ride on the aid of 
another, reducing overall levels of aid. Torsvik (2005) suggests that if donors cooperate then they 
may extend more aid, but this may then blunt recipients’ incentives to reform. On the other hand, 
donors may compete for favors from a recipient government. Favors may take the form of 
political support in international dealings or purchasing equipment or services from donor 
countries’ firms. Competition in this dimension may lead to aid from different donors becoming 
strategic complements rather than substitutes, and the result might be too much (perhaps 
ineffective) aid relative to some cooperative benchmark. As is common in game theory, specific 
results are likely to depend on the type of competition posited and the possibilities of cooperation 
developing. We therefore remain agnostic as to the effect of strategic effects on the total quantity 
of aid extended and suggest that this is an empirical question, to be analyzed confronting the 
data. 
 
3. Data Description 
 
We constructed two databases to consider bilateral and multilateral aid allocation decisions. The 
first is a traditional panel database including aid for each recipient country over time, with   
annual data from 1970-2003. The second is a database that is organized both by recipient and by 
donor, the latter including the 22 nations that are included in the OECD database on development 
assistance. Both databases include direct bilateral aid, aid financed by multilaterals’ own 
resources and aid given to multilaterals from bilaterals. In the last case, in the database that is 
organized by donor and by recipient, the amount an individual donor gives to an individual 
recipient is imputed from the total extended from each donor to each multilateral and the amount 
given from that multilateral, out of those funds, to each recipient. We provide further details on 
data sources and definitions in Appendix 1.   9
Following the previous literature, we develop several variables to explain aid allocation.  
Regarding politics, we define political ties as the correlation between the voting pattern of the 
recipient and donor countries in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In the traditional panel 
database we only employ political ties (correlation of voting patterns) with the US. However, we 
note that the voting pattern across G7 countries is highly correlated, so this variable can be 
interpreted as political ties with G7 countries.
9 In the database that discriminates across 
individual donors we employ the actual bilateral correlation of voting patterns between donor 
and recipient. 
In order to assess the importance of economic links, we define a variable that summarizes 
economic ties. In the traditional panel database, this variable is the sum of trade, foreign direct 
investment and bank claims from the 22 bilateral donor countries. In the database that 
discriminates across donors, this variable is the sum of bilateral trade, bilateral FDI and bilateral 
bank claims. In the regressions we use the log of this variable.   
We employ various recipient characteristics in our regressions following the literature. 
These include GDP per capita to assess whether aid tends to go to poorer countries, per capita 
growth, an openness index and an index of how democratic the recipient countries’ political 
institutions are.  The last two controls are an attempt to see if donors favor countries that are 
either more open or more democratic when it comes to allocating aid.  
Given the arguments that the concentration of bilateral aid to a particular recipient may 
affect the relative efficiency of bilateral lending, we define the Herfindahl index of bilateral 
lending. The Herfindahl index is simply the sum of the square of the lending shares and runs 
from zero to one.
10 The definition of this variable is common to both databases. 
In he database with both donors and recipients identified, we employ two further 
variables to capture strategic effects: a) the amount of aid that comes from all other donors 
excluding the individual donor in question, and b) the total number of donors. The first variable 
should capture the slope of the reaction function. Hence, if aid flows from different donors are 
strategic complements (positively sloped reaction functions), we would expect a positive 
coefficient on this variable, whereas if they are strategic complements (negative sloped reaction 
                                                       
9 We find correlation coefficients of greater than 0.7 across G7 countries. 
10 The Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of the square of the relevant shares If a recipient received an equal 
amount of bilateral aid from two donors then this variable would be 0.5 and if it received aid from a very large 
number of donors then it would be close to zero.   10
function) we would expect a negative coefficient. The second variable captures whether the total 
amount of aid extended by each donor depends positively or negatively on the total number of 
donors. If donors cooperate we would expect this variable not to be significant. If more donors 
results in less aid per donor (a negative coefficient), this result would indicate free-riding. If 
more donors results in more aid per donor as a percentage of recipient GDP then, controlling for 
other factors, this would be consistent with a non-cooperative aid-for-favor game. 
 
4. Empirical Specifications and Results 
 
4.1. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid by Recipient, Traditional Panel Regressions 
 
Our basic econometric model can be represented as follows:   
 
(1)  ijt t j jt jt jt jt HINDEX TIES RECIP aid ε ν η γ δ β α + + + + + + =  
 
where j=1,……,175 recipients and t=1,…,7 five-year intervals spanning the period 1970-2003. 
Our dependent variable is total bilateral or multilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
net flows divided by the GDP of the recipient.
11  RECIP is a vector of recipient economic 
characteristics that includes GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth, as well as indices for 
democracy and trade openness. TIES is a vector of time varying bilateral variables that includes 
economic ties (represented by the log of the sum of trade, FDI  and bank claims between each 
recipient and all 22 donors), and political ties (represented by the correlation of UN voting with 
the United States). HINDEX is the Herfindahl index, which is the sum of the squares of the 
lending shares of each bilateral donor in each recipient. j η  is a recipient country fixed effect that 
controls for any other time-invariant characteristic (including a colonial relationship with any 
donor or geographic or strategic position, for example; such regressions often include a dummy 
for Israel and Egypt) that may affect aid allocation decision, and  t ν  are time dummies 
controlling for potential common trends.
12  
Table 1 illustrates the estimation results of equation (1).  We report results for bilateral 
aid, multilateral aid, aid financed by bilaterals intermediated by multilaterals and in the final 
column a regression specifically for the World Bank. In common with the findings in the 
                                                       
11 In our analyses, we do not include multilateral lending as a determinant of bilateral and vice versa. We did try 
this, and we sometimes found the relevant variable significant. Generally we did not, however, and we found little 
change with respect to the other coefficients or their significance reported below.  
12 In this traditional panel we focus on recipient variables so do not introduce donor effects.   11
literature, we find evidence that relative to recipient GDP, more aid is extended  to small 
countries and that politics is a significant determinant of aid allocation.  
 
 
Table 1. Aid Determinants: Traditional Panel Model 
(Dependent Variable is Aid/GDP from Different Sources as Indicated) 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (3) 
  Bilateral Multilateral  Bilateral via World Bank 
     Multilaterals  
        
GDP (Log)  -50.821  -23.254  -23.261  -5.373 
 (3.29)***  (2.43)**  (2.91)***  (0.95) 
GDP Per Capita Growth (t-1)  -9.691  0.176  -8.021  0.762 
 (2.04)**  (0.06)  (1.74)*  (0.40) 
GDP Per Capita (Log)  40.490  13.461  16.659  4.269 
 (2.36)**  (1.13)  (1.69)*  (0.65) 
Openness -3.676  1.051  -0.061  2.553 
 (1.31)  (0.41)  (0.04)  (1.48) 
Democracy Index  0.066  -0.360  -0.734  -0.266 
 (0.19)  (1.32)  (2.84)***  (1.56) 
Economic Ties (Log)  0.104  0.629  0.701  0.274 
 (0.06)  (0.43)  (0.56)  (0.15) 
UN Alignment with US  16.137  10.421  10.476  5.109 
 (2.95)***  (2.68)***  (2.38)**  (2.17)** 
Hindex 15.882  2.970  -1.402  2.537 
 (3.37)***  (0.65)  (0.48)  (0.73) 
Constant -129.774  -20.920  -54.402  -13.407 
 (1.51)  (0.33)  (1.06)  (0.36) 
Observations 323  323  284  251 
Number of id  94  94  81  73 
R-squared 0.35  0.15  0.36  0.11 
Robust t statistics in parentheses.       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
All regressions include fixed effects.       
 
As well as confirming the results in the literature, we also find a strong Herfindahl effect 
for bilateral aid. This means that when bilateral lending becomes more concentrated, bilateral 
lending tends to increase. We interpret this result as evidence of an aid fragmentation effect as, 
conversely, if aid becomes more fragmented then less aid is extended. Note that this variable is 
not significant for multilateral aid nor for bilateral aid extended via multilaterals.   12
We also ran a set of  “difference-in-difference” equations or, in other words, regressions 
with fixed effects (similar to taking first differences) but where the dependent variables were a) 
bilateral aid minus multilateral aid,  b) bilateral aid minus bilateral aid intermediated via 
multilaterals, and c) bilateral aid minus World Bank aid.  We then particularly considered 
whether the coefficient on politics and on the Herfindahl index was significant to assess whether 
there is evidence that multilaterals dilute the effect of political alignment or solve coordination 
problems. The results are presented in Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2. Tests for Multilateral Dilution of Politics 
and Fragmentation 
      
 (2)  (3)  (3) 
  Bilateral -  Bilateral -  Bilateral - 
  Multilateral   Bilateral via  World Bank 
   Multilateral  
     
UN Alignment with US 5.715  8.226  17.710 
 (1.18)  (1.73)*  (3.20)*** 
Herfindahl Index  12.912  18.343  19.500 
 (3.04)***  (4.01)***  (3.43)*** 
 
Note that the coefficient on the Herfindahl index is positive and significant, indicating 
that multilateral intermediation does appear to reduce problems of aid fragmentation. Indeed, as 
this coefficient was not significant for multilateral aid in Table 1, the evidence suggests that 
multilateral intermediation may solve this particular problem. We also find the coefficient on the 
political alignment variable to be positive and significant for the case of bilateral aid minus 
World Bank aid and significant at the 10 percent level for bilateral aid intermediated through 
multilaterals. There is then some evidence for a dilution effect, although we note that we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on bilateral minus aggregate multilateral aid is not 
significant.
13 
However, in the regressions above, we are not exploiting the fact that we may identify 
individual bilateral donors as well as individual recipients. By separating out both the donor and 
the recipient dimension we can analyze strategic effects between donors, test whether it is   13
appropriate to pool across donors (taken as given above), and control for any possible 
unobservable donor-recipient bilateral characteristic that do not vary over time. This provides a 
substantial improvement, as in the regressions the above we only control for recipient fixed 
effects.  
 
4.2 Donors’ Aid Pushing, Coordination and Strategic Behavior 
 
In this section, we turn to our second database that considers bilateral assistance from individual 
donor countries to individual recipients. Our basic empirical model is now of the following form: 
 
(3) 
ijt t ij ijt
jt ijt jt it ijt
STRATEGIC
HINDEX TIES RECIP DONOR aid
ε ν η φ
γ δ χ β α
+ + + +
+ + + + =
 
 
where i=1,…., donors, j=1,……,175 recipients and t=1,…,7 five- year intervals spanning the 
period 1970-2003. The dependent variable is now ODA net flows divided by GDP for each 
individual donor, either bilateral or multilateral. ECON  represents the economic variables of the 
recipient and does not vary across donors. It therefore does not change from any aggregate 
specification of equation (1). DONOR are now variables that capture donor characteristics that 
change over time, as suggested by Chong (2006), including GDP and Institutional Quality (the 
ICRG index). Recipient characteristics include GDP and GDP per capita. TIES  is now a vector 
of truly bilateral variables that reflect economic (trade plus FDI plus bank claims) and political 
alignment (the correlation of voting in the UN general assembly) between specific donors and 
recipients. HINDEXjt is the Herfindahl index of aid concentration, and STRATEGICijt are 
variables that capture Strategic Interactions between donors,  ij η  are the donor-recipient fixed 
effects controlling for other possible time invariant relations between donors and recipients that 
might affect aid allocation decisions, and  t ν  is the usual time effect. This model is then much 
more general than those found in the literature to date, as we include Recipient effects, Donor 
effects, Ties and variables to capture coordination and strategic effects. 
Still, equation (3) depicts a pooled model where we have just one coefficient for each of 
our variables of interest and hence the coefficient is assumed to be the same across all donors. In 
                                                                                                                                                                           
13 In separate tests not reported here we find that politics (U.S. alignment) is not significant in a regression of aid 
from Regional Development Banks. Note that typically the United States and G7 have lower voting shares in these 
organizations relative to the World Bank.   14
the appendices we present the results of an unrestricted model with direct bilateral aid as the 
dependent variable and a set of F tests to test whether pooling is rejected by the data. We ran 
regressions for different numbers of donors. As more donors are added, the procedure of running 
the unrestricted regression and testing for similar coefficients becomes more and more 
cumbersome. The results for the top five donors, namely the United States, Japan, France, 
Germany and United Kingdom, and results for the top 10 donors are presented in Appendix 3 
with relevant F tests for pooling  in Appendix 5. The main result of these experiments is that, 
with fixed effects added, we cannot reject pooling. Specifically, we find we cannot reject pooling 
for Political Alignment, Economic Ties, and GDP per capita, nor for the indicator of quality of 
Democracy.
14 
We also explored the effects of aid fragmentation and strategic interactions between 
donors. As discussed, fragmentation may reduce the effectiveness of aid and donors may then 
extend less aid, so we include the Herfindahl index of aid concentration. We expect this to have a 
positive coefficient if aid fragmentation decreases aid. To capture potential strategic interactions 
we include two further variables. First, we use aid from Other Donors, excluding aid from the 
individual donor in question. This variable then varies across donors, recipients and time. 
Second, we include the number of donors. Our idea is that if donors compete for favors using 
aid, then we would expect a positive coefficient for these two variables, suggesting positively- 
sloped reaction functions. On the other hand, if donors free ride on others’ aid we would  then 
expect a negative coefficient on these variables, suggesting a negative reaction function. 
The results are included in Table 3. We find that donor characteristics do help to explain 
donor-recipient aid patterns. Donor GDP is significant in all specifications so larger donors give 
more aid as a percentage of recipient GDP. The donor ICRG (institutional quality) index is 
significant with a positive sign in the  specifications with fixed effects. With respect to ties, we 
also find that political alignment is significant across all specifications, confirming that political 
ties matter for bilateral aid determination.
15  Without the fixed effects, as expected we find 
colony and common language to be significant, confirming the previous results in this literature. 
                                                       
14 Without fixed effects, pooling is rejected for a number of variables. For example, the colony variable in the 
unrestricted model is relevant for France but less relevant for other donors. 
15 All the tie variables now refer to the actual tie between donor and recipient (i.e., UN alignment is the correlation 
between the individual recipient and the individual donor voting in the UN).   15
We also find Economic ties to be significant, although this variable loses significance when fixed 
effects are added.  
In terms of the strategic variables, we illustrate different specifications in Table 3. When 
we properly control for non observables with fixed effects, the Herfindahl index is always 
significant. If we include the number of donors variable, then and the variable representing Other 
Donors’ aid is not significant.. There is no evidence for co-linearity between these variables and 
our preferred specification is the last column with the Herfindahl index and the Number of 
Donors. The conclusion is that there is evidence of an aid fragmentation effect given the 
importance of aid concentration (Herfindahl) and that the aid packages of different donors are 
strategic complements given the positive coefficient on the number of donors. 
  We can also run regressions identifying individual donors and recipients for bilateral aid 
that is intermediated via multilaterals through trust funds and other vehicles. The comparison 
between direct bilateral aid and aid intermediated through multilaterals is of interest to see what 
role multilaterals might play in altering aid allocation and hence (perhaps) its effectiveness.  In 
Table 3 we present our preferred specification for bilateral aid (the last column of Table 3), the 
same specification for bilateral aid intermediated through multilaterals. Both of these regressions 
include fixed effects and hence are akin to regressions in first differences. In the final column of 
Table 4, we also present a difference in difference regression of bilateral aid minus bilateral aid 
intermediated through multilaterals to see if there are significant differences between the two. 




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model Pooled OLS Pairwise FE Pairwise FE Pairwise FE
Donor Characteristics
GDP (Log) 1.393 4.580 4.529 4.492
(5.85)*** (5.68)*** (5.59)*** (5.56)***
Institutional Quality (ICRG Index) -0.040 0.547 0.555 0.544
(0.82) (3.15)*** (3.14)*** (3.13)***
Recipient Characteristics
GDP (Log) -0.784 -1.342 -1.506 -1.700
(7.96)*** (1.23) (1.36) (1.57)
GDP Per Capita (Log) -0.749 0.703 0.454 0.958
(7.79)*** (0.63) (0.40) (0.85)
GDP Per Capita Growth (t-1) 0.104 -0.371 -0.511 -0.422












Economic Ties (Log) 0.433 0.050 0.066 0.054
(8.76)*** (1.16) (1.58) (1.24)
UN Alignment 0.347 0.587 0.862 0.669
(1.71)* (2.17)** (3.06)*** (2.50)**
Donor Strategic and Coordination
Herfindahl Index 0.306 1.241 1.184 1.427
(0.48) (1.88)* (2.04)** (2.33)**
Number of Donors 0.083 0.166 0.185
(2.04)** (2.88)*** (3.34)***
Other Donors' Aid (% GDP) 9.536
(1.21)
Constant -3.287 -43.446 -37.236 -41.313
(1.34) (4.19)*** (3.70)*** (4.01)***
Observations 6076 6076 6076 6076
Time Effects no yes yes yes
Number of pairs 2,098 2,098 2,098
R-squared^ 0.23 0.06 0.05 0.06
Robust t statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
^ Reported R-squared for within variation.
Table 3. Aid Determinants: Pairwise Regressions 
(Dependent Variable is Bilateral Aid/GDP Recipient)  17
Note that, when we run the regression with the bilateral aid intermediated by multilaterals 
as the dependent variable (second column), the Herfindahl is not significant. The number of 
donors is significant, but with a reduced coefficient. The politics variable (UN alignment) is 
significant in this regression, with a somewhat reduced coefficient compared to the direct 
bilateral aid regression in the first column.  
When we run the regression with the difference between bilateral and bilateral aid 
intermediated through multilaterals, then we find that both the Herfindahl and the Number of 
Donors variables are significant. We can conclude that there is evidence for a dilution effect of 
multilaterals regarding both aid fragmentation (the fact that this variable is not significant in the 
second column suggests multilateral intermediation may eliminate this problem) and the strategic 
effects between donors. Note that the coefficient on politics (UN alignment) is not significant in 
the third column and hence while the coefficient is reduced for multilaterally intermediated aid, 




                                                       
16 We did find some evidence for a dilution effect above  for multilaterally financed aid. See Table 1.   18
 
Table 4. Effect of Multilateral Intermediation 
(all regressions include pairwise fixed effects) 
      
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Model Bilateral Bilateral  via Bilateral  - 
   Multilateral Bilateral  via 
     Multilateral 
     (1)-(3) 
Donor Characteristics      
GDP (Log)  -2.240  -1.100  -0.556 
 (1.85)*  (3.53)***  (0.40) 
Institutional Quality (ICRG Index)  0.711  0.163  0.689 
 (3.81)*** (4.56)***  (3.15)*** 
Recipient Characteristics      
GDP (Log)  -1.700  -0.835  -1.096 
 (1.58)  (3.60)***  (0.95) 
GDP Per Capita (Log)  0.911  0.522  0.851 
 (0.82)  (2.14)**  (0.70) 
GDP Per Capita Growth (t-1)  -0.412  -0.159  -0.097 
 (1.73)*  (1.86)*  (0.35) 
Bilateral Ties      
Economic Ties (Log)  0.071  0.049  -0.018 
 (1.72)*  (4.03)***  (0.40) 
UN Alignment  0.672  0.437  0.230 
 (2.54)** (5.04)***  (0.83) 
Donor Strategic and Coordination      
Herfindahl Index  1.410  0.079  1.756 
 (2.34)** (0.93)  (2.43)** 
Number of Donors  0.180  0.045  0.119 
 (3.33)*** (4.78)***  (1.78)* 
      
Constant 16.700 9.313  2.466 
 (2.12)** (4.58)***  (0.27) 
Observations 6,288  6,157  5,248 
Time Effects  yes  yes  yes 
Number of pairs  2,239  2,093  1,889 
R-squared 0.06  0.14  0.03 
Robust t statistics in parentheses.     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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4.3 Dynamic Panel Representation: GMM 
 
The above panel regressions are static models that do not include the lagged dependent variable 
and also where some variables may be considered as endogenous. In order to test the robustness 
of our results, we also ran a dynamic version of these models with fixed effects, including a 
lagged dependent variable and alternative instrumentation strategies. 
   
Table 5. Politics, Strategic Interaction and Coordination 
GMM Estimation with Alternative Instrumentation Strategies 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Difference (2)-(3)
via Multilateral
(Aid (% GDP)) (t-1) 0.57 0.51 0.33 0.45
(9.07)*** (8.65)*** (7.15)*** (6.13)***
Donor Characteristics
GDP (Log) 0.80 1.15 0.51 1.75
(1.72)* (1.62) (5.12)*** (1.33)
Institutional Quality (ICRG Index) 1.02 3.22 0.58 4.35
(1.80)* (1.95)* (1.84)* (2.48)**
Recipient Characteristics
loggdp -0.63 -0.84 -0.01 -0.97
(2.89)*** (2.89)*** (0.20) (2.85)***
GDP Per Capita Growth  -0.59 -0.94 -0.06 0.50
(3.38)*** (2.20)** (0.94) (1.03)
GDP Per Capita (Log) -0.23 -0.02 -0.39 -1.12
(1.19) (0.08) (4.79)*** (1.65)*
Dummy for Natural Disaster 0.05 0.03 -0.07 0.09
(0.58) (0.25) (2.09)** (0.48)
Bilateral Ties
Economic Ties (Log) 0.41 0.77 0.06 0.98
(2.67)*** (2.43)** (1.89)* (2.48)**
UN Alignment 0.78 1.24 0.43 0.55
(2.95)*** (1.87)* (3.06)*** (0.71)
Donor Strategic and Coordination
Herfindahl Index 2.09 1.86 0.12 3.05
(2.26)** (1.75)* (0.44) (1.75)*
Number of Donors 0.26 0.36 -0.01 0.29
(1.65)* (1.74)* (0.50) (1.17)
Constant -5.85 -16.32 -2.38 -22.55
(0.94) (1.41) (1.18) (1.52)
Observations 7,006 7,006 6,581 5,256
Number of pairs 2,153 2,153 2,116 1,768
Time Effects yes yes yes yes
Hansen test of over-id (p-value) 0.01 0.41 0.00 0.93
AR(1) in first differences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
AR(2) in first differences 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.17
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Instrument Set of column (2)-(4): Recipient Characteristics and Colonial Relationship, Common Language, 
Distance Egypt and Israel.
Instrument Set of column (1): Recipient Characteristics, Bilateral Ties and Colonial Relationship, Common 
Language, Distance Egypt and Israel.
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The results are illustrated in Table 5. The first column shows the results of a regression 
for bilateral aid employing the Blundell-Bond system GMM procedure. In this procedure the 
levels regression and the first difference regression are performed simultaneously. In this column 
we use a wide instrument set including past values of the endogenous variables as well as ones 
which are more clearly exogenous such as colonial relationships, common language, distance 
and Egypt and Israel dummies.
17 The second column gives the results of the same regression 
excluding the past values of endogenous variables such as economic and political ties. The 
Hansen test results indicate that the standard list may not be valid instruments, whereas the 
second, more clearly exogenous set of variables, are certainly valid according to these tests. 
However, the results are robust across the two columns. 
In particular, we find that the lagged dependent variable is significant. We also find as in 
our previous regressions that politics is significant. Interestingly we also find that the Economic 
ties variable is significant. The results on strategic behavior and coordination are quite robust 
compared to the previous regressions in that the Herfindahl index is significant in all 
specifications and there is some evidence for a positive coefficient on the total number of donors 
indicating again, if anything, a positive reaction function, suggesting an “aid for favor” game 
between donors. 
In Column 3 we perform a similar regression but with the bilateral aid intermediated 
through multilaterals as the dependent variable. Here neither instrument set may be valid, and we 
only present the results with the second set; the results must therefore be viewed cautiously. Still, 
as before, we now find insignificant coefficients for the Herfindahl and the Number of Donors 
variables and, also as before, Politics remains significant. When we perform the difference-in- 
difference procedure in the final column, the second set of instruments appears to be valid, and 
again we find evidence of no dilution in Politics. We do, however, again find evidence for 
dilution in the aid fragmentation effect. The evidence for a dilution effect in the strategic variable 
(number of donors) but the point coefficient in the regression for bilateral aid intermediated 
through multilaterals is negative and not significant, so there is no evidence for a strategic effect 
for this type of aid. 
                                                       
17 Note that an advantage of using the Blundell-Bond system estimator (that estimates a levels equation and a first 
difference equation) is that time-invariant variables may be used as instruments.    21
5. Conclusions 
 
Our general view is that donor countries may face a trade-off regarding whether to channel aid 
bilaterally or use the intermediary of a multilateral. On the one hand a multilateral may bring 
benefits in terms of leverage and enhanced coordination, but on the other hand a multilateral may 
dilute the individual objectives of bilateral donors. 
In keeping with the previous literature, we find that for direct bilateral assistance, politics 
matters. We find that with fixed effects added we cannot reject the hypothesis that politics 
influences different bilateral donors in the same way, and the relevant pooled coefficient is 
positive and significant. We also find strong evidence for an aid fragmentation effect. Where aid 
is more concentrated, then controlling for other factors, recipients receive more aid. Finally, if 
anything, we find evidence that aid packages from different donors are strategic complements 
consistent with an aid-for-favor type game. 
Multilaterals intermediate in two ways, first financing aid from their own resources built 
upon the capital initially invested by bilaterals and second more directly through the medium of 
trust funds and other vehicles that bilaterals may finance but that are managed by the 
multilaterals. For aid financed by multilaterals we find some evidence for dilution of the effect of 
politics, especially with reference to World Bank aid. We find little evidence for the dilution of 
politics in aid intermediated through trust funds and the like, perhaps due to the conditions that 
are applied to the use of these resources. We find strong evidence that multilaterals solve 
problems of coordination and of strategic interactions between donors. In short, intermediating 
through multilaterals may enhance donor coordination, but at some cost in terms of individual 
bilateral (political) objectives, which is consistent with the idea of a trade-off. 
There is much more to be done in this area of research.  We have suggested a set of trade-
offs, but as yet there is no good theoretical model that captures all of the ideas mentioned. This is 
an obvious area for future research.  As suggested in the introduction, we also believe that there 
is a link between the determinants of the pattern of aid and its effectiveness. In particular, 
bilateral aid allocated according to colonial ties or politics may also imply ineffective aid, 
whereas aid extended due to other donor characteristics may suggest more altruistic motives and 
perhaps more effectiveness. Finally, aid fragmentation may also lead to less effective aid.  These 
all appear to be interesting avenues for future analysis.   22
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 Category Variable Description Scale Source Notes
GDP GDP in constant international price natural log PWT
GDP GDP in constant international price natural log WDI
Egypt dummy variable for Egypt binary 0-1 WDI
Israel dummy variable for Israel binary 0-1 WDI
Distance distance between donor and recipient natural log
Aggregate score obtained as the difference between democracy and autocracy
Openness
Sachs and Warner Index of Trade 
Openness
natural units in 
(0,1) interval
Sachs and Warner 
(1995), updated by 
Tabellini et al (2005)
A country is rated as an open economy according to the foollowing four criteria: (1) 
average tariff rates below 40 %, (2) average quota and licencing coverage of imports 
of less than 40 %, (3) black market exchange rate premium that averaged less than 
20 % and (4) no extreme controls (taxes, quotas, state monopolies) on exports 
Democracy Polity 4 index
natural units in 
(0,1) interval
Growth 
Annual percentage change of GDP per 
capita in constant 2000 international price
percent












Distribution of Financial 
Flows to Aid Recipient
The Total Official Development Assistance (ODA) includes grants or loans to countries 
and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which 
are : - undertaken by the official sector; - with promotion of economic development 
and welfare as the main objective. - at concessional financial terms (if a loan, have a 
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Herfindahl index computed for the lending 




Gini Index of Income Inequality Gini Coefficient
Number of years as a colony of donor since 
1900
sum of bilateral trade, FDI and bank claims 
between recipient and donor
Economic ties 
with donors
International Country Risk Guide Index of 
Institutional Quality
Annual correlation of voting records in 
UNGA between recipient and donor
GDPPC
natural units in 
(0,1) interval
Votes were recorded at each UN General Assembly according to the following 
criterion: 1 Yes, 2 Abstain, 3 No, 8 Absent, 9 Not a Member. Linear correlation 
coefficent between donor and recipient voting patterns is then computed for each 
 natural log IMF, UNCTAD, BIS
natural units in 
(0,7) interval
Erik Voeten,  Political 
Science and 
International Affairs.
natural units in 
(-1,1) interval
Let a(i) be the aid share of donor i in recipient j, then the Hindex is computed as:  Authors' computation 
based on OECD, 2005. 
Total Aid given to each recipient minus 
each donors specific contribution
in percent
Authors' computation 
based on OECD, 2005. 
Number of Donors giving aid to the same 
recipient
natural units in 
(0,22) interval
Authors' computation 
based on OECD, 2005. 
Multilateral Aid 
(% GDP)





Distribution of Financial 
Flows to Aid Recipient
The Total Official Development Assistance (ODA) includes grants or loans to countries 
and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which 
are : - undertaken by the official sector; - with promotion of economic development 
and welfare as the main objective. - at concessional financial terms (if a loan, have a 
















natural units in 
(0,1) interval




Aid Disbursements that bilaterals put into 
multilaterals, apportioned according to the 
percentages the multilaterals give to each 
recipient






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
aid_gdp aid_gdp aid_gdp aid_gdp aid_gdp aid_gdp
growth GDPPC (t-1) -3.47 -1.54 -3.56 -1.67 -3.93 -1.80
(2.19)** (1.07) (2.26)** (1.12) (2.46)** (1.19)
log(GDPPC) -1.93 -4.42 -1.45 -2.38 -1.52 -1.22

























democracy 2.14 3.89 1.83 0.12 0.47 0.13





















openness 0.70 0.21 0.69 0.22 0.58 0.21
(2.12)** (0.61) (2.10)** (0.64) (1.63) (0.61)
log(economic ties with donors) -0.31 -1.10 -0.27 -0.00 0.01 0.02
(2.50)** (1.75)* (2.11)** (0.04) (0.21) (0.21)
log(economic ties with donors)*FRANCE 0.33 0.67
(1.31) (0.62)
log(economic ties with donors)*GERMANY 0.01 1.54
(0.06) (2.28)**
log(economic ties with donors)*JAPAN 0.30 1.45
(1.92)* (2.06)**
log(economic ties with donors)*UK 0.30 0.97
(1.89)* (1.50)
log(economic ties with donors)*NETHERLANDS 0.28 1.26
(2.12)** (2.00)**
log(economic ties with donors)*ITALY 0.35 1.49
(2.45)** (2.08)**













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
APPENDIX 2: BILATERAL AID BY DONOR (TOP 10), VARIOUS MODELS
UNRESTRICTED POOLED PARSIMONIUS
log(economic ties with donors)*CANADA 0.33 1.04
(2.52)** (1.65)*
log(economic ties with donors)*SWEDEN 0.37 1.42
(2.49)** (2.08)**
log(economic ties with donors)*AUSTRALIA 0.34 1.09
(2.73)*** (1.70)*
log(economic ties with donors)*NonUSA
















political allignment with donors 2.01 -0.30 0.59 1.44 0.73 1.55
(1.30) (0.15) (2.31)** (2.85)*** (2.35)** (2.99)***
political allignment with donors*FRANCE -0.38 5.83
(0.20) (1.54)
political allignment with donors*GERMANY -1.65 3.42
(0.98) (1.52)
political allignment with donors*JAPAN -2.95 1.29
(1.62) (0.64)
political allignment with donors*UK -0.75 1.53
(0.45) (0.68)
political allignment with donors*NETHERLANDS -2.08 0.04
(1.34) (0.02)
political allignment with donors*ITALY -1.86 0.14
(1.16) (0.07)
political allignment with donors*CANADA -2.18 1.00
(1.40) (0.51)
political allignment with donors*SWEDEN -2.16 0.14
(1.38) (0.07)
political allignment with donors*AUSTRALIA -0.89 4.24
(0.47) (0.93)
Hindex 0.17 2.45 0.08 2.38 1.70 2.38
(0.24) (2.42)** (0.12) (2.33)** (1.41) (2.30)**
israel 16.65 5.89 0.00 1.76



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)









egypt 8.19 5.89 0.00 0.35























FRA 1.23 0.04 -1.25
(0.16) (0.01) (1.85)*
DEU -1.03 0.95 -1.08
(0.22) (0.22) (2.16)**
JPN -6.14 0.66 -1.44
(1.38) (0.15) (3.00)***
GBR -10.31 -0.83 -4.64
(2.41)** (0.19) (6.94)***
NLD -11.07 -8.36 -2.48
(2.98)*** (2.15)** (5.83)***
ITA -11.05 -8.37 -2.40
(2.68)*** (2.14)** (5.56)***
CAN -13.15 -8.53 -2.53
(3.54)*** (2.19)** (5.99)***
SWE -13.14 -8.64 -2.64
(3.21)*** (2.21)** (5.95)***
AUS -15.53 -9.07 -2.64
(3.95)*** (2.33)** (4.06)***
Constant 18.08 10.50 14.40 9.55 13.37 9.63
(5.12)*** (2.81)*** (3.78)*** (2.60)*** (9.32)*** (2.60)***
Observations 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880 3880
R-squared 0.41 0.09^ 0.39 0.05 0.26 0.04^
Number of pair 933 933 933
Time effects yes yes yes yes
Note:
^Reported R-squared for withing group variation
Robust t statistics in parentheses











economic ties with donors









APPENDIX 3: TEST OF LINEAR RESTRICTIONS 











economic ties with donors
FRA=DEU=UK=JPN=
=NLD=ITA=CAN=SWE=AUS
2.52 (0.01) Egypt dummy
1.21 (0.28) FRA=DEU=UK=JPN=
=NLD=ITA=CAN=SWE=AUS
political allignment with donors
FRA=DEU=UK=JPN=
=NLD=ITA=CAN=SWE=AUS
Israel dummy 4.41 (0.00)
FRA=DEU=UK=JPN=
=NLD=ITA=CAN=SWE=AUS
FRA=DEU=UK=JPN=
=NLD=ITA=CAN=SWE=AUS
1.58 (0.13)
1.53 (0.15)
0.88 (0.52)
1.51 (0.15)